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Abstract 
Organizational research advocates that firms balance exploration and exploitation yet acknowledges 
inherent challenges in reconciling these opposing activities. To overcome these challenges, such research 
suggests that firms establish organizational separation between exploring and exploiting units or engage 
in temporal separation whereby they oscillate between exploration and exploitation over time. 
Nevertheless, these approaches entail resource allocation tradeoffs and conflicting organizational routines, 
which may undermine organizational performance as firms seek to balance exploration and exploitation 
within a discrete field of organizational activity (i.e., domain). We posit that firms can overcome such 
impediments and enhance their performance if they explore in one domain while exploiting in another. 
Studying the alliance portfolios of software firms, we demonstrate that firms do not typically benefit from 
balancing exploration and exploitation within the function domain (technology versus marketing and 
production alliances) and structure domain (new versus prior partners). Nevertheless, firms that balance 
exploration and exploitation across these domains by engaging in R&D alliances while collaborating with 
their prior partners, or alternatively by forming marketing and production alliances while seeking new 
partners, gain in profits and market value. Moreover, we reveal that increases in firm size that exacerbate 
resource allocation tradeoffs and routine rigidity reinforce the benefits of balance across domains and the 
costs of balance within domains. Our domain separation approach offers new insights into how firms can 
benefit from balancing exploration and exploitation. What matters is not simply whether firms balance 
exploration and exploitation in their alliance formation decisions but the means by which they achieve 
such balance.  
 
 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1543447
 
 3
Introduction 
The notion of exploration and exploitation has received much attention in management research since it 
was introduced by March (1991: 71): “Exploration includes things captured by terms such as search, 
variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation. Exploitation includes such 
things as refinement, choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution.” According to 
Levinthal and March (1993), exploration enables the creation of new knowledge, whereas exploitation 
supports the refinement and use of existing knowledge. Prior research has advocated that “maintaining an 
appropriate balance between exploration and exploitation is a primary factor in system survival and 
prosperity” (March 1991: 71), underscoring the positive performance implications of such balance. 
Surprisingly, despite extensive discussion of the merits of balance, with few exceptions (He and Wong 
2004; Sidhu, Commandeur, and Volberda 2007), empirical evidence of performance effects has been 
mostly furnished by anecdotal case studies (e.g., Tushman and O’Reilly 1996), offering limited support to 
this balance hypothesis. In this study we suggest that prior research has underestimated the organizational 
impediments associated with firms’ efforts to balance exploration and exploitation, and that the 
performance implications of such balance depend on the means by which firms pursue this balance.    
Established approaches for balancing exploration and exploitation, namely temporal separation and 
organizational separation, impose managerial challenges and organizational impediments that may offset 
the payoffs from balancing these two activities. Rooted in the notion of bounded rationality and sequential 
attention to divergent goals (Cyert and March 1963), temporal separation entails oscillating between 
exploration and exploitation over time (Gibson and Birkinshaw 2004), so that firms explore at one point 
in time and then exploit at another (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997). Nevertheless, such transitions are not 
trivial, and their implementation requires adaptability and agility. In turn, literature on the ambidextrous 
organization has advocated simultaneous pursuit of exploration and exploitation via organizational 
separation, whereby firms build dual governance into their organization (Duncan 1976) with 
organizational units exclusively dedicated to either activity (Benner and Tushman 2003; O’Reilly and 
Tushman 2004; Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Hence, this approach seemingly overcomes the tradeoff 
  4
between these conflicting activities: “the learning, resources, and routines necessary for exploration and 
exploitation are different. As such, they may be delegated within a group or organization so that both can 
be achieved simultaneously” (Gupta, Smith, and Shalley 2006: 696). Nevertheless, maintaining separate 
organizational units creates operational redundancy and merely relegates the challenge of coordinating 
exploration and exploitation to the top management team. In the current study we contend that these 
organizational impediments can outweigh the benefits of balance, so that firms that simultaneously 
explore and exploit may suffer negative performance consequences. Furthermore, we advance the domain 
separation approach that relieves firms from some inherent tradeoffs associated with these established 
approaches, and thus can enhance firms’ abilities to successfully balance exploration and exploitation.  
We maintain that the limited empirical support for March’s balance hypothesis can be ascribed to the 
attempts of prior research to study the implications of balance between exploration and exploitation only 
within a single domain, i.e., within a discrete field of organizational activity, such as in the function 
domain wherein a firm can either engage in innovation or commercialization of technologies. This mode 
of balance is analogous to a seesaw that seeks a delicate equilibrium between conflicting loads imposed 
on its opposite sides. Thus, firms that follow temporal or organizational separation face resource 
allocation tradeoffs and need to maintain conflicting routines within a particular domain. In contrast, we 
consider how firms can balance their exploration and exploitation tendencies not only within but also 
across discrete domains which together describe the organizational activity in question (e.g., Lavie and 
Rosenkopf 2006; Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001). Acknowledging the prevalence of multiple domains in 
which firms can engage in exploratory and exploitative activities, such domain separation does not entail 
separate organizational units with distinctive sets of conflicting routines. Instead, it offers flexibility for 
firms to pursue exploration in one domain and exploitation in the other as long as balance is maintained 
across domains. We expect such balance to enhance firm performance by maintaining both novelty and 
efficiency while dislodging the firm from the inherent tradeoffs between exploration and exploitation. The 
benefits of balance across domains are expected to intensify with firm size because operating on a large 
scale entails more rigid routines, which makes it more difficult to reconcile discrepancies within domains.  
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Our study examines these predictions in the context of alliance portfolios. Firms rely on alliances 
both to explore new opportunities and to leverage existing skills (Koza and Lewin 1998 2000; Rothaermel 
2001). In particular, scholars have noted with respect to the value chain function of alliances that 
exploration enables the acquisition of new capabilities (Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman 1996), whereas 
exploitation supports product commercialization (Rothaermel 2001). Prior research indicates that firms 
tend to balance exploration and exploitation in their alliance portfolios (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006). 
However, the only evidence on the performance effects of balance reveals reduced resource accumulation 
as a result of structural balance in a firm’s tendency to explore new alliance relationships versus exploit 
prior ties to partners (Lin, Yang, and Demirkan 2007). The implications of balance within and across 
these domains have thus remained ambiguous. Prior research does not fully account for balancing effects, 
since it typically limits its investigation to a single domain.  
We conceptualize the domain separation approach based on the well-established distinction between 
the function domain (knowledge-generating versus knowledge-leveraging alliances) and the structure 
domain (new versus prior partners). Even though one may specify an alliance relationship along various 
dimensions such as industry focus or partners’ cultural fit, prior research on exploration and exploitation 
in alliances has almost exclusively focused on the function and structure domains, identifying them as 
most relevant for alliance formation decisions (e.g., Beckman, Haunschild, and Phillips 2004; Grant and 
Baden-Fuller 2004; Koza and Lewin 1998; Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006; Lin et al. 2007; Park et al. 2002; 
Rothaermel 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004). We argue that in the context of a firm’s alliances, 
resource allocation tradeoffs and conflicting organizational routines result in negative performance 
implications when firms balance exploration and exploitation within the function and structure domains. 
In turn, domain separation can serve as an effective approach for achieving balance between exploration 
and exploitation. Our approach reconciles opposing perspectives on the merits of balancing exploration 
and exploitation by revealing that some forms of balance are more effective than others.  
Studying the alliances of U.S.-based software firms during 1990-2001, we furnish evidence on the 
performance effects of balance within and across the function and structure domains. In accordance with 
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the domain separation approach, we find negative effects of balance within the structure domain 
(tendency to seek proportional representation of new versus prior partners in an alliance portfolio) on 
firms’ market value and net profit. In turn, balancing exploration and exploitation across the function and 
structure domains (e.g., forming R&D alliances yet engaging in recurrent alliances with prior partners) 
improves these performance outcomes. Furthermore, we demonstrate that as firms grow, balancing within 
domains becomes less effective while balancing across domains becomes a more effective means for 
enhancing performance. These findings shed new light on March’s balance hypothesis and contribute to 
emerging research on ambidexterity and alliance portfolios.  
Theoretical Background 
Interfirm alliances enable firms to share and exchange resources for the purpose of jointly developing or 
providing technologies, products, or services (Gulati 1998). In line with Levinthal and March (1993), 
Koza and Lewin (1998) suggested that firms may establish alliances to jointly exploit their existing 
knowledge or to explore new opportunities. Most prior research has followed this distinction between 
exploration and exploitation in alliances based on the value chain function that alliances serve (e.g., Park, 
Chen, and Gallagher 2002; Rothaermel 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004). According to this tradition, a 
firm that collaborates with its partners in upstream activities of the value chain, such as R&D initiatives 
that may result in innovative technologies or products, engages in exploration in the function domain. In 
contrast, a firm that uses alliances for performing downstream activities of the value chain, such as 
commercialization or application of existing technologies, pursues exploitation in that domain. Hence, 
scholars have associated a firm’s tendency to acquire and generate new knowledge through exploration 
with R&D alliances, contrasting them with marketing and production alliances that serve for exploitation 
by leveraging, integrating, and implementing existing knowledge (Grant and Baden-Fuller 2004; Lavie 
and Rosenkopf 2006; Park et al. 2002; Rothaermel 2001; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004).  
Besides the function domain, recent research on alliances has acknowledged efforts to explore and 
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exploit in the structure domain (e.g., Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006; Lin et al. 2007).1 Exploration in the 
structure domain refers to a firm’s tendency to seek opportunities by forming alliances with new partners 
that lack prior ties to the firm, wherein the firm expands its network boundaries beyond the immediate 
structure of its alliance portfolio. Thus, in accordance with March’s (1991) notion of exploration, 
exploration in the structure domain creates new opportunities but increases risk and uncertainty because 
the firm cannot rely on prior experience with its new partners. In turn, exploitation in the structure domain 
refers to a firm’s efforts to consolidate its alliance portfolio by forming recurrent alliances with a select 
group of partners with whom the firm has established ties for accessing resources that reside within its 
alliance portfolio (Beckman et al. 2004; Lin et al. 2007). Per March’s (1991) notion of exploitation, 
alliances with prior partners reinforce the firm’s current knowledge base (Beckman et al. 2004), leverage 
its partnering experience (Hoang and Rothaermel 2005) and rely on accumulated trust to enhance the 
predictability and reliability of collaboration (Baum, Rowley, Shipilov, and Chuang 2005; Chung, Singh, 
and Lee 2000; Gulati 1995b; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Li and Rowley 2002). Hence, firms’ tendencies to 
explore or exploit manifest in both the function and structure domains of alliances.  
Prior research has identified some antecedents to firms’ tendencies to engage in exploration and 
exploitation within either the function or the structure domains of alliance formation. Such tendencies 
may lead to imbalance between exploration and exploitation within each domain. Some studies identify 
industry conditions such as market uncertainty as drivers of either exploration or exploitation (Beckman 
et al. 2004; Rothaermel 2001). Other studies consider firm-specific antecedents of exploration and 
exploitation tendencies (Park et al., 2002; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004), yet little is known about what 
guides firms’ decisions to explore versus exploit in their alliance formation decisions. In attempt to 
reconcile inconsistent findings and explain firms’ attempts to balance exploration and exploitation in 
                                                 
1 In addition to the function and structure domains, Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006) refer to exploration and exploitation 
in the attribute domain, considering how the characteristics of partners differ from those of the firm’s prior partners. 
Together, these three domains effectively describe an alliance by considering the value chain function of the 
alliance, the structural position of the partners, and their relative attributes. However, the characteristics by which 
partners differ are themselves multidimensional and may reveal inconsistent patterns. We thus exclude the attribute 
domain and focus on the function and structure domains in accordance with established research on exploration and 
exploitation in alliances.   
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alliances, Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006) demonstrated that partnering experience leads to exploration in the 
function domain (shifting from marketing and production alliances to R&D alliances) and exploitation in 
the structure domain (shifting from new to prior partners). They further reveal patterns of slack-induced 
search whereby profitable firms engage in more extensive function exploration, and document path 
dependence in exploration versus exploitation tendencies within each domain. Finally, they show how 
firms balance these tendencies across domains by shifting from existing to new partners while engaging 
in more marketing and production alliances as opposed to R&D alliances. Nevertheless, these studies do 
not uncover the performance implications of such balance.  
In this regard, prior research suggests that exploration and exploitation are both essential for 
organizational performance. Whereas exploitation leverages existing knowledge and relationships, 
exploration generates new knowledge and social capital. Firms that engage in exploration but neglect 
exploitation may end up with undeveloped ideas and unrealized opportunities. In turn, overinvestment in 
exploitation at the expense of exploration may exhaust firms’ opportunities and render their competencies 
obsolete (March 1991). Hence, firms that simultaneously explore and exploit are expected to achieve 
superior performance relative to firms that emphasize one activity at the expense of the other (Tushman 
and O’Reilly 1996). This balance hypothesis has served scholars in conjecturing about the merits of 
balancing exploration and exploitation in alliance portfolios (e.g., Lin et al. 2007).  
According to prior research, alliances extend a firm’s boundaries so it can engage in value chain 
activities that are otherwise unavailable given its internal resources and market opportunities (Dyer 2000; 
Gulati 1999; Lavie 2006). A firm that restricts its portfolio to R&D alliances forgoes opportunities that 
cannot be efficiently tapped by its internal organization as a result of limited market access. In turn, a firm 
that limits its portfolio to marketing and production alliances may fail to internalize external knowledge 
that cannot be developed internally (Hagedoorn 1993; Mowery et al. 1996; Rothaermel 2001). Thus, prior 
research suggests that an alliance portfolio that overemphasizes either exploration or exploitation within 
the function domain is sub-optimal (Hoffmann 2007). Similarly, alliances with new partners introduce 
new opportunities, diverse information, and novel ideas beyond the reach of a firm’s immediate alliance 
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portfolio (Stuart 2000). In turn, recurrent alliances with prior partners leverage interfirm trust and 
established routines for tight coordination, joint problem solving, and conflict resolution (Gulati 1995a; 
Rowley, Behrens, and Krackhardt 2000; Kale, Singh, and Perlmutter 2000; Uzzi 1996). Hence, prior 
research suggests that a firm that fails to balance exploration and exploitation within the structure domain 
may not be able to fully capitalize on the benefits of its alliance portfolio, and its performance may suffer 
as a result (Lin et al. 2007). Despite the compelling rationale of the balance hypothesis, empirical 
evidence in support of this premise has been limited at best. We next argue that resource allocation 
tradeoffs and conflicting organizational routines may offset the benefits of balance within domains. We 
then propose that balance across domains generates more favorable performance implications in alliances.  
Hypotheses 
 
Despite the potential merits of balance in the function and structure domains, exploration and exploitation 
are often at odds, requiring firms to manage tradeoffs when pursuing these activities simultaneously. 
These tradeoffs are instigated by competition for scarce resources that support both activities and by the 
fact that these activities rely on distinctive modes of organizational behavior and routines (March 1991). 
The self-reinforcing nature of these routines strengthens the dominant activity while driving out the other 
(Levinthal and March 1993; March 1991). Consequently, most firms would find it challenging to 
reconcile the tension between exploration and exploitation (Tushman and O’Reilly 1996). Firms that 
strive to balance exploration and exploitation encounter cultural, structural, demographic, and process 
incongruities and also face conflicts between their exploring and exploiting units (Abernathy 1978; 
Benner and Tushman 2003; Tushman, Anderson, and O’Reilly 1997). The increased demand for 
operational resources and the coordination challenges imposed by conflicting routines can thus impair 
performance. A firm’s use of alliances enables it to attenuate internal resource allocation constraints by 
sharing resource investments with partners. However, similar tension between exploration and 
exploitation emerges when the firm attempts to balance these activities in its alliance portfolio. Resource 
allocation constraints and organizational conflicts merely shift from internal units to the alliance 
organization, yet remain detrimental.  
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In particular, a firm may face resource allocation tradeoffs when balancing exploration and 
exploitation within the function domain. Whereas R&D alliances entail risky investments in new 
technologies, marketing and production alliances commercialize existing knowledge in search of 
immediate payoffs. Thus, the firm faces a dilemma in supporting these distinctive types of alliances in its 
portfolio given the disparity in their objectives and associated risk levels. Supporting collaborative R&D 
initiatives may come at the expense of leveraging established technologies with marketing partners and 
enhancing operational efficiency. The tradeoffs in allocating resources to R&D alliances versus marketing 
and production alliances may diminish the effectiveness of the alliance portfolio and its responsiveness to 
emerging market conditions, and thus undermine its contribution to firm performance.  
Moreover, organizational routines that support knowledge-generating alliances contradict those that 
underlie knowledge-leveraging alliances throughout the alliance lifecycle. Specifically, the former favor 
collaborating with innovative and flexible partners whereas the latter favor engaging partners that 
underscore productivity and stability. Additionally, function exploration entails search, evaluation, and 
internalization of external knowledge (Zahra and George 2002), whereas function exploitation 
necessitates integration, application, and refinement of existing knowledge (Grant and Baden-Fuller 
2004). These conflicting processes lead to inconsistencies as a firm seeks to balance exploration and 
exploitation in its alliance portfolio. Finally, the criteria for evaluating the outcomes of these two types of 
alliances differ, which can lead to improper feedback and negative learning effects across alliances. A 
balance-seeking firm may fail to develop relevant partnering routines because departure from a consistent 
pattern of repetitive behavior impedes the evolution of organizational routines (Nelson and Winter 1982; 
Zollo, Reuer, and Singh 2002). Such disparity in the alliance portfolio may also result in misapplication 
of partnering routines that fit one type of alliance but not the other. Hence, balancing exploration and 
exploitation in the function domain can impair firm performance.  
Similarly, in the structure domain, firms encounter tradeoffs in resource allocation and inconsistent 
organizational routines when seeking to balance formation of new ties with elaboration of existing ties 
(Beckman et al. 2004; Lin et al. 2007). Whereas recurrent alliances with prior partners entail local search 
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and the nurturing of strong ties with a small set of partners, alliances with new partners encourage 
boundary spanning and the casting of a broad net using indirect contacts and referrals (Burt 2000; 
Rosenkopf and Nerkar 2001). Because local search and boundary spanning require distinctive orientations, 
a firm that balances exploration and exploitation within the structure domain must develop conflicting 
partner selection routines, which impairs specialization and attenuates the efficiency of alliance formation. 
The potential substitution between resources offered by established partners and those furnished by 
prospective partners can lead to conflict and sub-optimal partner selection. Furthermore, whereas 
alliances with new partners often rely on formal governance mechanisms such as explicit contractual 
safeguards, alliances with prior partners can leverage informal agreements and interfirm trust (Gulati and 
Singh 1998; Reuer and Arino 2007). A firm that balances exploration and exploitation needs to juggle 
these conflicting governance modes and may fail to develop consistent practices for managing its 
alliances. Misapplication of partnering routines can then lead to opportunistic behavior when blindly 
trusting new partners or to inefficiency and tension when enforcing formal governance in alliances with 
long-time partners. Partners may also become dissatisfied with preferential treatment or inconsistent 
arrangements employed in otherwise equivalent alliances. These caveats compromise the firm’s ability to 
benefit from simultaneous engagement in exploration and exploitation within domains. Consequently, a 
firm that balances exploration and exploitation within the function and structure domains may undermine 
the effectiveness of its alliance portfolio and suffer negative performance consequences. 
H1. Firm performance will be negatively related to balance between exploration and exploitation within 
(a) the function and (b) the structure domains of alliance formation decisions. 
 
We have noted that balancing exploration and exploitation within domains incurs inherent 
organizational tradeoffs and impediments that may offset innovativeness and productivity gains from 
alliance portfolios. Nevertheless, a firm can avoid these challenges and still enjoy the benefits of balance 
by exploring in one domain while exploiting in another. For example, a firm may form recurrent R&D 
alliances (engaging in function exploration) with existing partners (engaging in structure exploitation) to 
generate new knowledge while leveraging familiarity and established partnering routines. Alternatively, it 
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can extend its market reach for existing products (engaging in function exploitation) by signing up many 
new resellers (engaging in structure exploration). Such balance across domains generates important 
benefits and at the same time transcends the impediments associated with balance within domains.  
By focusing on R&D alliances and working with familiar partners, or instead, concentrating on 
collaborative marketing and production while seeking new partners, the firm can simultaneously generate 
new opportunities and leverage its accumulated experience while reducing its exposure to excessive risk. 
Following March’s (1991) broad notions of exploration and exploitation, the exploratory and exploitative 
activities need not take place in a single domain as long as the firm finds ways to embrace both 
established and emerging stimuli in its alliance portfolio. Hence, the firm can balance exploration and 
exploitation while supporting specialization within each domain. Specifically, the firm can develop 
functional expertise in either collaborative R&D or joint marketing and production activities and thus 
enhance the effectiveness of its alliances. At the same time it can nurture distinctive relational capabilities 
(Kale, Dyer, and Singh 2002) for collaborating with a coherent group of established partners or rather 
specialize in managing an evolving portfolio of new partners. Hence, the firm can seek opportunities by 
investing either in new knowledge development or in the heterogeneity of partners in its portfolio. In 
addition, it can enhance efficiency by either leveraging its established relationships or its experience with 
existing knowledge. Furthermore, by exploring in one domain and exploiting in the other such firm can 
attenuate certain types of risk and uncertainty associated with its alliance portfolio. It can decide whether 
to reduce technical risk in new technology development or rather avoid managerial challenges associated 
with ties to unfamiliar partners. The ability to decide in which domain to engage in exploration rather than 
exploitation supports the firm’s efforts to specialize and thus improves the performance of its alliance 
portfolio. Therefore, a firm that balances exploration and exploitation across the function and structure 
domains can reduce risk and uncertainty while gaining efficiency and social capital which eventually 
contribute to firm performance (Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman 2000; Lee, Lee, and Pennings 2001). 
Balancing exploration and exploitation across domains can not only provide important benefits but 
also eliminate certain organizational impediments associated with balance within domains. Assuming that 
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the function and structure domains of alliance portfolios are independent, balancing exploration and 
exploitation across these domains enables a firm to attenuate inconsistency of behavioral patterns and 
avoid resource allocation tradeoffs that prevail when operating within a particular domain. Circumventing 
internal coordination of conflicting activities within each domain economizes on the firm’s investments in 
distinctive partnering routines and facilitates the use of consistent routines for managing its alliances in 
each domain. Consequently, the firm can eliminate inherent tradeoffs and conflicts associated with 
reliance on inconsistent partnering routines. For example, a firm’s practices for testing emerging 
technologies and assimilating partners’ knowledge in the course of joint R&D alliances do not counter the 
firm’s investments in relation-specific assets, the development of interfirm trust, and the use of informal 
governance mechanisms, which are essential in repeated alliances with prior partners (Gulati 1995a). 
Hence, balance across domains enables the firm to simultaneously nurture organizational routines that 
regulate exploitation in one domain while supporting exploration in another (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006). 
It enables the firm to overcome some organizational impediments that emerge when attempting to balance 
exploration and exploitation within domains while still enabling it to enjoy the benefits of balance in its 
alliance portfolio. Balancing exploration and exploitation across domains thus enhances firm performance.  
H2. Firm performance will be positively related to balance between exploration and exploitation across 
the function and structure domains of alliance formation decisions.  
 
We have thus far argued that balancing exploration and exploitation within domains enables a firm to 
generate new sources of knowledge and social capital while leveraging existing knowledge and 
relationships. However, such balance entails tradeoffs in resource allocation and internal conflicts 
associated with the use of inconsistent organizational routines. Consequently, balance within domains 
should undermine firm performance whereas balance across domains, which circumvents these 
impediments, is expected to produce positive performance effects. In accordance with our conjectures, we 
would expect such performance implications to intensify as resource allocation tradeoffs and conflicting 
routines exacerbate. We argue next that these tradeoffs and conflicting routines exacerbate as the firm 
grows in size, thus making the balance within domains less beneficial whereas the performance 
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implications of balance across domains become more favorable. 
First, balancing exploration and exploitation within domains creates escalating resource allocation 
tradeoffs as a firm grows in size. At first glance, it may seem that a growing firm becomes less sensitive 
to resource allocation constraints (Lin et al., 2007); however, the availability of internal resources makes 
such firm less dependent on alliances as a primary source of resources (Lavie 2006). Specifically, smaller 
firm size implies limited reliance on internal value chain activities and greater dependence on alliance 
partners for both exploratory R&D activities and exploitative marketing or production activities. The 
ability to create social capital by maintaining both new and established relationships with partners is more 
central to a firm’s reputation and eventual performance when it possess limited assets (Gulati and Higgins 
2003; Stuart, Hoang, and Hybels 1999). As the firm grows in size it becomes more self-reliant and better 
able to carry out its internal operations, so that it is less vested in its alliance portfolio and less dependent 
on its alliance partners for furnishing network resources. An increase in firm size represents investments 
in assets owned by the firm’s internal organization, which could limit the availability of resources for 
supporting external collaborative engagements. Hence, the accumulation of internal assets may 
undermine the vitality of the alliance portfolio, thus exacerbating resource allocation tradeoffs in the 
portfolio. In particular, competition for resources that support both exploration and exploitation within the 
function or structure domains intensifies when a firm owns a rich resource base that can serve for carrying 
out these activities internally rather than through alliances. Therefore, balance within alliance domains 
imposes increasing challenges as the firm grows in size.  
Second, organizational routines that support opposing tendencies to explore versus exploit become 
pervasive as a firm grows in size, which results in organizational tension. A small firm size enables 
flexibility and better responsiveness when attempting to fine-tune exploration and exploitation efforts, but 
as the firm grows in size it may face stronger inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1984) and encounter 
reorganization challenges in the presence of conflicting partnering procedures. Given its enhanced 
flexibility, a small firm is sufficiently agile to transition between R&D alliances and production or 
marketing alliances or to juggle new and existing partners, but as it grows in size it tends to be more 
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bureaucratic and captive to its formal procedures (Child 1972), thus less flexible in modifying the 
composition of alliances in its portfolio. As the scale of its operations increases, the firm tends to rely on 
more formal procedures for carrying out partnering activities (Kale et al. 2002), and as a result, may find 
it more difficult to maintain inconsistent organizational procedures for simultaneously managing diverse 
types of alliances. The firm’s exploration and exploitation routines are likely to become rigid and thus 
generate tension and conflict as it strives toward balance within domains. With growing size, the firm 
may face stronger inertial pressures when employing different procedures or adjusting its routines for 
collaborating with new versus familiar partners or when engaging in R&D versus marketing or production 
alliances. Consequently, balancing exploration and exploitation within domains entails increasing friction. 
Resource allocation tradeoffs and routine rigidity that intensify with firm size increase the costs of 
maintaining a balance within the function and structure domains and impair the firm’s ability to 
effectively balance exploration and exploitation within these domains. 
Finally, in light of the inertial pressures that increase with firm size, a firm can benefit more from 
specializing in either exploration or exploitation within a given domain. As the firm grows in size it is 
inclined to invest in fixed assets and specialized personnel. Such large investments in specialized assets 
and the increasing formalization of administrative structure and operating procedures inhibit further 
adaptation (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Nickerson and Silverman 2003). As it gains in size, the firm’s 
heuristics give way to institutionalized rules and regulations that reinforce organizational routines (Nelson 
and Winter 1982). Consequently, increases in firm size limit the effectiveness of accommodating 
conflicting partnering routines. Nevertheless, as its size increases the firm can mitigate the organizational 
costs of balancing exploration and exploitation within domains by exploring in one domain while 
exploiting in another. For example, it can better benefit from engaging in recurrent alliances with partners 
that infuse new technologies, thus balancing function exploration with structure exploitation. Under such 
conditions, the firm is expected to gain increasing returns on specialization in either exploration or 
exploitation within each domain. Hence, a firm that attempts to balance activities across domains can 
enjoy the complementary benefits of exploration and exploitation while minimizing its reliance on 
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conflicting organizational procedures and mitigating the administrative costs that accumulate with firm 
size. As its partnering routines become more rigid and prohibit effective balance of exploration and 
exploitation within domains, balancing across domains becomes a more viable approach for a firm that 
gains in size. Despite its increasing size, the firm can avoid the rising costs of reconciling conflicting 
procedures within domains and benefit more from balance across domains of its alliance portfolio.  
H3. The negative associations between firm performance and balance within (a) the function domain and 
(b) the structure domain will intensify with increases in firm size.  
 
H4. The positive association between balance across domains and firm performance will intensify with 
increases in firm size. 
 
Methods 
Research setting and sample 
We tested our hypotheses using pooled time-series analysis of U.S.-based firms in the software industry 
(SICs 7371 through 7374). The dynamic and intensive formation of alliances in this industry enhances the 
meaningfulness, reliability, and variance of our variables. Our interviews with industry experts suggest 
that firms in this industry derive 30%-40% of their revenues from alliances, higher than the 26% revenue 
contribution reported in an Andersen survey of Fortune 500 firms (Kalmbach and Roussel 1999). Thus, 
alliances can meaningfully impact corporate performance in this industry. Moreover, the software 
industry features a high proportion of publicly traded firms, ensuring the accessibility of financial 
information and reducing potential size- and age-related biases. In addition, our sample is representative, 
since the worldwide software industry is dominated by U.S.-based firms. For instance, a Standard & 
Poor’s survey indicated that 23 of the top 25 software vendors are based in the United States, with U.S.-
based software firms accounting for half of the worldwide software market (Rudy 2000).2  
This study’s timeframe spanned 1990 to 2002, with historical alliances tracked back to 1985 in order 
to incorporate information on active alliances that were formed before 1990. This five-year window 
follows standard assumptions regarding the duration of alliances (Stuart 2000), which in our sample was 
                                                 
2 Most of the focal firms were single business firms. Specifically, 84% of the firms had only a primary SIC code 
10% had a single secondary SIC code, 5% had two secondary SIC codes, and less than 1% had three or four 
secondary SIC codes. Thus, it is appropriate to define the industry based on the primary SIC code. 
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shorter than five years (1.767 years on average). The initial sample included all 367 U.S.-based publicly 
traded software firms that were active in the year 2001, had at least five years of records in the Compustat 
database, and engaged in at least one alliance during the study’s timeframe.3 The effective sample size 
ranged between 320 and 339 firms because of the lag structure of our data, missing values,4 and the 
minimum number of observations per firm needed for computing the structure exploration variable. 
Alliance records first were compiled from the SDC database and then extracted from alliance 
announcements and status reports in press releases and partner listings posted on the Factiva database, 
corporate websites, and Edgar SEC filings. Most announcements were cross-validated by at least two 
independent sources. The original press announcement served as the primary source of information for 
coding purposes. By relying on multiple sources and tracking follow-up announcements and status reports, 
we minimized the recording of alliances that were announced but not realized. To further validate our 
data, we reviewed some of our alliance listings with a select group of corporate executives in charge of 
alliances. Following these procedures, alliance records were corroborated, corrected, added, or eliminated. 
In total, we identified 20,779 alliances involving 8,801 unique partners from various industries.5 For each 
alliance we coded the announcement date, pre-specified duration or termination date,6 number of partners, 
                                                 
3 We determined that the focus on U.S.-based firms that were active in 2001 and had at least five Compustat records 
is not likely to introduce a selection bias based on the lack of differences between the sampled firms and the 
remaining 297 publicly traded firms in the industry in terms of total assets (t = 1.43, p = .15), revenues (t = 0.53, p = 
.60), number of employees (t = 0.27, p = .79), net income (t = 1.48, p = .14), cash (t = 1.51, p = .13), long-term debt 
(t = 0.07, p = .95), stock price (t = 1.27, p = .20), and other relevant measures. These results suggest that our sample 
is representative of public firms in the software industry. 
4 Missing values occurred in several variables. For instance, information on R&D investments was missing for many 
firms that were not required to report these figures by SEC regulations. 
5 Only 24.7% of the identified alliances were reported in the SDC database. When comparing the proportions of 
different types of alliance agreements in our final database to those reported in SDC, we found that our data offers 
more extensive coverage of non-equity alliances (t = 25.85, p < 0.001) and alliances with foreign partners (t = 25.73, 
p < 0.001). The proportions of marketing (t = 34.36, p < 0.001), original equipment manufacturing (OEM) (t = 
22.89, p < 0.001), and R&D (t = 36.17, p < 0.001) agreements are also higher than in SDC, but the proportions of 
supply (t = -4.16, p < 0.001), licensing (t = -26.87, p < 0.001), and royalties (t = -2.03, p < 0.05) agreements are 
lower. These results rule out the possibility that the SDC database covers more substantial types of alliances. 
6 Alliance termination dates were unavailable for many alliances, because firms rarely announce alliance termination 
and occasionally maintain inactive alliances. If the date of alliance termination was unavailable from archival 
sources, when possible it was calculated based on alliance extension announcements and reports of active alliance 
status in a given year. For example, an alliance partner that was mentioned in a press release, in a 10K SEC form, or 
in listings of partners posted on the firm’s corporate website was coded as active during the year in which such 
report was found. Alliance termination dates were available for 23% of the alliances. Remaining alliances were 
assumed to have a three-year duration based on the average specified duration of other alliances in the sample as 
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and partners’ identities and countries of origin, as well as the strategic significance of the alliance, 
whether it was a joint venture, and its classification to categories of agreements: R&D, production, 
marketing and service, original equipment manufacturing / value-added resale, licensing, royalties, or 
supply. An alliance could involve more than one type of agreement. Edgar SEC files served for 
determining firms’ year of incorporation. Additional firm-specific data, such as total assets, revenues, 
long-term debt, cash, R&D expenses, and net income, were extracted on an annual basis from Compustat. 
Data on common shares outstanding and stock prices were gathered from the Compustat-CRSP database. 
The firm-year served as the unit of analysis because the dependent variables were defined at the firm level. 
The data for the 20,779 alliances were transformed to 2,587 firm-year observations corresponding to the 
years 1990–2001 by pooling the data for all alliances in a firm’s portfolio in a given year. The effective 
sample size in multivariate analysis ranged between 1,651 and 2,072 observations.  
Variables 
Dependent variables – firm performance. According to March, no single performance measure can 
fully capture the benefits of exploration and exploitation: “returns from exploration are systematically less 
certain, more remote in time….What is good in the long run is not always good in the short run” (1991: 
73). Thus, to avoid possible bias in measuring the outcomes of exploration versus exploitation, we used 
two performance measures: net profit as a short-term performance measure (Narayanan 1985) and firm 
market value as a long-term performance measure (Kale, Dyer, and Singh 2002). Net profit is considered 
an accounting measure of financial performance (Barnett, Greve, and Park 1994; Brush, Bromiley, and 
Hendrickx 2000), whereas market value represents investors’ ex ante expectations about firms’ future 
market performance (Lubatkin and Shrieves 1986). Market value was calculated by multiplying the firm’s 
stock price by the number of common shares outstanding. Due to the high volatility of this measure, the 
annual market value was calculated by averaging the 12 end-of-month daily values of the relevant 
                                                                                                                                                             
well as assessments of industry experts. The imputation of alliance termination dates is a common practice in 
alliance research. For example, Stuart (2000) imputed alliance duration for all alliances using a linear depreciating 
weighting for alliances with an earlier date of formation. In our study, the use of imputation was reduced by 
searching alliance status reports and recording alliance termination dates when available. We controlled for the 
implications of this imputation procedure by including a separate control for the average age of alliances. 
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calendar year. We lagged all the explanatory variables and controls in the performance model by one year 
relative to the dependent variables in order to facilitate causal interpretation of our findings.  
Function exploration. We operationalized exploration-exploitation with a combined continuous 
measure (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006) rather than with two separate indicators under the assumption that 
exploration inhibits exploitation and vice versa, so that these two activities conflict (Abernathy 1978; 
March 1991). This assumption is consistent with the negative correlation that we observed between 
upstream and downstream alliance formation in the function domain (r = -.710, p < .001). We followed 
Koza and Lewin’s (2000) distinction between exploration, exploitation, and hybrid alliances that integrate 
downstream and upstream activities. Based on alliance announcements, a categorical indicator denoted 
for each alliance whether it involved a knowledge-generating R&D agreement (coded “1”), another type 
of agreement based on existing knowledge involving joint marketing and service, OEM/VAR, licensing, 
production, or supply (coded “0”), or a combination of R&D and other agreements (coded “0.5”). Unlike 
internal R&D that draws directly from the firm’s existing knowledge, R&D agreements in the software 
industry entail moving outside of the firm’s technical knowledge base or at least integrating internal 
knowledge with external knowledge of partners, thus representing exploration. Our function exploration 
measure was calculated as the average value of the alliance agreement indicator across all alliances 
formed by the focal firm in year t. Values range from 0 to 1, with high values indicating function 
exploration and low values indicating function exploitation.  
Structure exploration. For each alliance formed by the focal firm, an indicator received a value of “1” 
if the firm had no joint prior alliances with its partner and “0” if such alliances existed. Then, for each 
firm, structure exploration was calculated as the average value of this indicator across all alliances formed 
by that firm in year t. In order not to classify a firm’s first alliance as structure exploration by default, for 
lack of prior partnering history, we excluded 181 firm-year observations corresponding to years in which 
firms formed their first and only alliance. Auxiliary analysis revealed, however, that our findings remain 
virtually unchanged when these observations are retained. Values range from 0 to 1, with high values 
indicating structure exploration and low values indicating structure exploitation.  
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Firm size. We measured firm size as the value of total assets reported in Compustat. Firm size served 
as a moderator of the relationship between exploration-exploitation and firm performance per hypotheses 
3 and 4. This measure was highly correlated with alternative measures based on firm revenues (r = .840, p 
< .001) and firm equity (r = .850, p < .001). We did not consider the number of employees given that the 
industry is not labor intensive. Robustness tests using the alternative measures produced consistent results. 
Control variables. We controlled for inter-industry variation by studying a single industry.7 In 
addition, our controls included annually updated firm- and portfolio-level variables that were lagged by 
one year relative to the dependent variables. Firm-level controls included firm size as measured by the 
value of total assets, firm R&D intensity as measured by R&D investments divided by revenues, and firm 
solvency as measured by the log-transformed ratio of cash to long-term debt. The firm’s available slack as 
captured by the solvency measure and its internal investment in R&D may be indicative of the firm’s 
tendency to engage in internal exploration efforts. The firm’s R&D intensity further controls for the 
extent to which the firm invests in completely new technologies versus ones with which it has some prior 
experience (Christensen 1998). We also included a measure of the firm’s number of acquisitions in a 
given year since acquisitions may serve as an alternative mode for undertaking exploration outside the 
firm’s boundaries (Schilling and Steensema 2002). Portfolio-level controls included the adjusted size of 
the alliance portfolio (Ahuja 2000; Baum et al. 2000; Stuart et al. 1999), calculated as the logarithm of the 
number of alliances divided by the firm’s total assets. The size of the alliance portfolio may be related to 
the firm’s investments in searching for partners and governing its alliances. Multi-partner alliances were 
decomposed to dyads for the purpose of calculating this control variable, which captures the firm’s 
propensity to form alliances. Hence, we also controlled for the average number of partners involved in 
each alliance. Following prior research (Contractor, Kundu, and Hsu 2003; Lavie and Miller, 2008), we 
controlled for the proportion of foreign partners in the alliance portfolio. To control for changes in the 
contributions of alliances as they progress, we measured the average age of alliances in the portfolio. We 
                                                 
7 An indicator of the firm’s four-digit SIC segment was not included as a control variable because of redundancy and 
the occurrence of complete separation when the firm fixed effects were also included in the tested models. 
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controlled for the complexity of alliances in the portfolio by including a measure of the proportion of 
different agreement types per alliance. In addition, we included a measure of the percentage of equity 
joint ventures in the alliance portfolio to control for the alliance governance structure. The strategic 
significance of alliances was controlled by measuring the percentage of alliances that were identified as 
strategic in alliance announcements. By measuring the duration, complexity, governance, and importance 
of alliance relationships we control for relational embeddedness in the alliance portfolio (Uzzi 1996). This 
set of controls helped us discern the performance effects of exploration and exploitation from the 
implications of other properties of the firm’s alliance portfolio. All remaining inter-temporal trends and 
interfirm heterogeneity were controlled for with firm fixed effects and year dummy indicators.8 
Analysis 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics. We used two-stage analysis for handling potential endogeneity in 
firms’ decisions to engage in exploration and exploitation in their alliances (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006). 
Firms’ tendencies to explore or exploit may derive from managers’ performance expectations based on 
firm attributes and industry conditions. Failing to account for such endogeneity may bias the estimates of 
exploration-exploitation effects and lead to erroneous conclusions (Hamilton and Nickerson 2003). The 
specification and results of our first-stage models are reported in the Appendix. The predicted values of 
function exploration and structure exploration from the first-stage models were entered as independent 
variables in the second-stage models, where the firm’s market value and net profit served as dependent 
variables. We implemented our second-stage models using cross-section time-series regressions with firm 
fixed effects. Fixed effects models control for unobserved heterogeneity in the form of time-invariant 
variables and in our case were found to be equivalent or superior to random effects models based on 
Hausman (1978) tests. The inclusion of firm fixed effects suggests that the reported models explain 
within-firm variation in performance over time rather than interfirm variation in performance. In addition, 
                                                 
8 In auxiliary analyses we considered additional control variables which were not reported eventually. For example, 
we accounted for synergetic portfolio effects due to overlap in partners’ businesses (Vassolo, Anand, and Folta 
2004). For each firm we calculated the number of partners with the same primary SIC code averaged across all 
unique SIC codes of partners in the firm’s alliance portfolio in a given year. This control variable produced positive 
yet insignificant effect on firm performance without affecting our reported results. 
  22
the analysis of panel data raises concerns about serial correlation of errors within cross-sections, which 
may deflate standard errors and inflate significance levels. Indeed, Baltagi-Wu (1999) locally best 
invariant (LBI) test for autocorrelation detected first-order autocorrelation in market value (LBI = 1.366) 
and net profit (LBI = 1.444). Autocorrelation was treated by incorporating first-order autoregressive errors 
in the tested models, assuming correlation of errors across adjacent years.9 Thus, the tested models took 
the form: yi,t+1 = α + βxi,t + ui + εi,t , where εi,t = ρεi,t-1 + μi,t and -1<ρ<1. In this equation, ui represents the 
firm fixed effects and ρ is the autoregressive AR(1) parameter, which has a zero mean, homoskedastic, 
and serially uncorrelated error term μi,t. We subjected these models to maximum likelihood estimation, 
treating missing values with listwise deletion.  
We relied on partial models for testing our hypotheses since tests for potential multicollinearity 
indicated that the maximum VIF index in the full models exceeded the critical value of 10 (Kleinbaum, 
Lawrence, Muller, and Nizam 1998). The high VIF values can be ascribed to the multiple instances of the 
function exploration and structure exploration variables and the firm size moderator. Still, VIF values 
dropped significantly and no symptoms of multicollinearity were present (Maddala 2001) in Models 4 
and 9, which simultaneously incorporated the effects of function exploration and structure exploration. 
We evaluated the fit of our models with log likelihood ratio tests comparing each model to the baseline 
model (Model 1) after adjusting for the number of observations discarded because of missing values. 
Insert Tables 1-4 about here 
 
Results 
Tables 2-3 and 4 correspondingly report the results of hierarchical second-stage models for balance within 
domains and balance across domains. Since we run parallel analyses for each dependent variable, we use 
the subscripts “MV” and “NP” to connote models for market value and net profit respectively. Models 
1MV and 1NP are baseline models that include the control variables. Hypotheses 1a-b predicted negative 
performance implications of balance within (a) the function domain (tested with Models 2MV and 2NP) and 
                                                 
9 Potential contemporaneous (cross-sectional) correlation across firms in the panel data was also tested and ruled out 
since the additional covariance parameter turned out to be insignificant. 
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(b) the structure domain (tested with Models 3MV and 3NP). A negative linear term of the exploration 
variable and a positive quadratic term in these models would suggest a U-shaped curve in support of this 
set of hypotheses. Even though the coefficients had the expected signs, Models 2MV and 2NP indicate no 
significant effects of balance within the function domain on either market value or net profit, with the 
exception of a significant positive effect of the quadratic term of function exploration on firm market 
value (β = 18.37, p < .05). This finding does not support the premise that balance within the function 
domain has favorable performance implications. Instead, excessive exploration in that domain contributes 
to superior market value.10 Model 3MV reveals a negative effect of structure exploration (β = -152.1, p 
< .001) and a positive effect of its quadratic term on market value (β = 85.38, p < .001). Similarly, Model 
3NP reports a negative effect of structure exploration (β = -5.348, p < .01) and a positive effect of its 
quadratic term on net profit (β = 3.154, p < .01). These U-shaped patterns of structure exploration are 
consistent with hypothesis 1b. These results remain significant when testing the effects of function 
exploration and structure exploration simultaneously in Models 4MV and 4NP.  
Hypotheses 3a-b predicted that the negative performance implications of balance within (a) the 
function domain (tested with Models 5MV and 5NP) and (b) the structure domain (tested with Models 6MV 
and 6NP) will intensify with increases in firm size. These hypotheses are supported if the performance 
function becomes more concave (U-shaped as opposed to inverted U-shaped) when the exploration 
variables are moderated by firm size. In support of hypothesis 3a, Model 5MV (Table 2) reveals a positive 
effect of function exploration on market value (β = 21.69, p < .001) and a negative effect of its quadratic 
term (β = -24.09, p < .001). In turn, the interaction effect of firm size and function exploration on market 
value is negative (β = -110.5, p < .001), while the interaction of firm size and the quadratic term of 
function exploration is positive (β = 136.17, p < .001). Similarly, Model 5NP (Table 3) indicates a positive 
linear effect (β = 1.552, p < .001) and a negative quadratic effect (β = -1.464, p < .001) of function 
                                                 
10 In auxiliary analysis we dropped the quadratic term from Model 2MV. The difference in fit statistics between the 
reported model and the linear model was significant (∆ -2LL = 5.1, p < 0.05). We thus conclude that even though 
the linear term in Model 2MV is insignificant, the curvilinear function better fits the data than a linear function, in 
accordance with Hypothesis 1MV. 
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exploration on net profit. The interaction of firm size with the linear term of function exploration is 
negative (β = -6.433, p < .001), while its interaction with the quadratic term of function exploration is 
positive (β = 6.624, p < .001). These findings demonstrate how the effects of function exploration on 
market value and net profit shift from inverted U-shaped to U-shaped with increases in firm size.  
Similarly, Model 6MV (Table 2) reveals a positive linear effect (β = 165.5, p < .001) and a negative 
quadratic effect (β = -95.74, p < .001) of structure exploration on market value. The interaction of firm 
size with the linear term of structure exploration is negative (β = -311.6, p < .001), while its interaction 
with the quadratic term is positive (β = 170.2, p < 0.01). In Model 7NP (Table 3) the linear effect of 
structure exploration on net profit is positive (β = 3.873, p < .05), whereas the effect of its quadratic term 
is negative (β = -2.215, p < .1). The interaction effect of firm size with the linear term of structure 
exploration is negative (β = -13.71, p < .001), whereas its interaction with the quadratic term is positive (β 
= 7.944, p < .001). Hence, these findings reveal how the effects of structure exploration on market value 
and net profit shift from inverted U-shaped to U-shaped with increases in firm size in accordance with 
hypothesis 3b. The interaction effects of firm size with the function and structure exploration functions 
remain significant when introduced simultaneously in Models 7MV and 7NP. Figure 1 depicts the predicted 
performance functions for balance within domains. This figure reaffirms the U-shaped effects of balance 
within the function and structure domains, revealing modest superiority of function exploration and a 
major advantage of structure exploitation, as firms grow in size. 
Table 4 reports the results of models used for testing hypotheses 2 and 4 on the performance 
implications of balance across domains. In particular, Models 9MV and 9NP serve to test hypothesis 2 by 
introducing a linear interaction of function exploration and structure exploration. Positive main effects 
and negative interaction effects would suggest that simultaneous increases in exploration in both domains 
are not beneficial, as predicted by this hypothesis. Accordingly, when exploration is extensive in one 
domain and limited in the other, firm performance should improve. Indeed, these models reveal positive 
effects of function exploration on market value (β = 84.47, p < .001) and net profit (β = 2.86, p < .01) as 
well as positive effects of structure exploration on market value (β = 30.83, p < .05) and net profit (β = 
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1.276, p < .1). Yet, the interaction effects of function exploration and structure exploration are negative 
for both market value (β = -84.3, p < .001) and net profit (β = -2.928, p < .05). In support of hypothesis 2, 
these findings suggest that when a firm increases exploration in either the function or the structure domain, 
its performance improves, but when exploration increases in both domains it faces decline in performance. 
Finally, Models 10MV and 10NP serve to test hypothesis 4 which suggested intensifying positive 
effects of balance across domains as firms gain in size. These models supplement Models 9MV and 9NP by 
introducing interaction terms for its covariates with firm size. Hypothesis 4 gains support to the extent 
that the moderated effects reinforce those tested by Models 9MV and 9NP, i.e. positive interactions of firm 
size with function exploration and structure exploration as well as a negative three-way interaction of firm 
size with function exploration and structure exploration. Indeed, Model 10MV provides such support with 
positive interaction effects of firm size with function exploration (β = 170.07, p < .001) and structure 
exploration (β = 78.66, p < .001) and a negative three-way interaction effect on market value (β = -188.7, 
p < .001). Similarly, Model 10NP offers support to hypothesis 4 with positive interaction effects of firm 
size with function exploration (β = 6.314, p < .001) and structure exploration (β = 3.074, p < .001) and a 
negative three-way interaction effect on net profit (β = -8.277, p < .001).11 Thus, the negative effect of the 
interaction between function exploration and structure exploration on net profit intensifies with firm size. 
Figure 2 shows favorable performance implications of balance across domains for a mean-sized firm, 
especially for a configuration of function exploration and structure exploitation. The benefits of balance 
across domains intensify with increases in firm size, but at very small firm sizes, balance across domains 
produces unfavorable performance implications. Our results are summarized in Table 5. 
Insert Table 5 about here 
Robustness Tests 
                                                 
11 The multiple inclusions of the exploration variables and the moderator in these models resulted in high VIFs 
(reaching 34.78 in Model 10MV and 34.56 in Model 10NP). However, with the exception of insignificant 
unmoderated terms of function and structure exploration in Model 10NP, no symptoms of multicollinearity were 
observed and the exclusion of the interaction terms of firm size with the exploration variables, while significantly 
reducing VIF levels, retained the negative effects of the three-way interactions. Furthermore, our models produced 
consistent results after dropping insignificant controls such as firm R&D intensity, firm solvency, alliance age, 
agreements per alliance, and percentage of foreign partners, thus attenuating concerns of multicollinearity.   
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To test the robustness of our findings we first considered alternative operationalizations of firm 
performance. This auxiliary analysis revealed that hypothesis 1 gained support with respect to function 
exploration when firm performance was measured as growth in market value and with respect to structure 
exploration when firm performance was measured as growth in net profit. Hypothesis 2 gained support 
when growth in net profit or exponential growth in market value served as an alternative performance 
measure. Additionally, hypotheses 3 and 4 gained support when growth in market value was used as the 
dependent variable. Nevertheless, our reported measures of firm performance (market value and net 
profit) were more consistent. Additionally, our results were robust to the inclusion of net profit as a 
control variable when testing market value models and vice versa. Moreover, we tested the robustness of 
incorporating one-year lag between exploration activities and our performance measures by considering 
models in which we introduced two- and three-year lags. Our results revealed that models with one-year 
lag produced better fit statistics, thus reaffirming our model specification. Furthermore, we considered the 
possibility that different types of alliances produce outcomes at different stages of their lifecycles by 
incorporating an interaction of alliance age with function exploration in our models. This term turned out 
insignificant and did not influence the significance of our predicted effects.  
Next, we considered a firm’s revenues as an alternative measure of the size moderator, finding that 
our results remained significant with the exception of the unmoderated effects of function exploration and 
structure exploration on net profit in Models 5NP-7NP, the main effect of structure exploration on net profit 
in Model 9MV, and the main effects and interaction of function exploration and structure exploration on 
net profit in Models 9NP and 10NP. We then considered the possibility that our moderator captures the 
effect of the size of the firm’s alliance portfolio. When we replaced the firm size moderator with a 
measure of the number of partners in the firm’s alliance portfolio, hypotheses 3 and 4 gained support, 
which is understandable given the high correlation between the number of partners and the firm’s asset 
value (r = .740, p < .001) and revenues (r = .520, p < .001). To isolate our moderation effect we tested 
revised models in which both firm size and the size of the alliance portfolio were introduced as 
moderators. In these models the moderation effects of firm size retained their levels of significance, 
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whereas the moderation effects of the size of the alliance portfolio became inconsistent or insignificant 
with the exception of the effect on the association between balance in the structure domain and the firm’s 
market value. Similarly, when firm age was used as a moderator instead of firm size, hypotheses 3 and 4 
gained partial support with insignificant interaction effect of firm age and function exploration on market 
value. When the firm age moderator was incorporated together with the firm size moderator, the 
interactions involving firm size remained significant whereas the interactions with firm age lost 
significance or became inconsistent due to suspected multicollinearity. These auxiliary analyses reaffirm 
our choice of firm size as a moderator.12  
In addition, we considered second-order exploitation (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006), whereby prior 
exploration experience in a particular domain may help some firms enhance the effectiveness of 
subsequent exploration efforts in that domain. We tested the effects of exploration in the function and 
structure domains moderated by prior exploration experience in the corresponding domain. The 
moderation effects of prior experience in the function domain were insignificant but the interaction of 
structure exploration and prior exploration experience had a positive effect on market value (the main 
effect was negative). A similar pattern was observed with net profit as the dependent variable, although 
the moderation effect was only marginally significant. Thus, gaining experience in forming alliances with 
new partners enables the firm to enhance the contribution of such alliances to its performance. 
Accordingly, the benefits of exploration and exploitation may be idiosyncratic and depend on the firm’s 
particular exploration experience in certain domains.   
Discussion 
Following March (1991), scholars have advocated the balance between exploration and exploitation yet 
acknowledged the challenges that firms may face when pursuing such balance (Gupta et al. 2006). 
Organizational and temporal separation have been offered as a means for simultaneously exploring and 
                                                 
12 The partially significant moderation effects of firm age and the size of the alliance portfolio are consistent with 
our theory, since resource allocation constraints and conflicting organizational routines can result not only from the 
impediments associated with a large organization but also from the rigidities ascribed to maturation and increases in 
the number of alliances in the portfolio. Yet, resource allocation constraints may be less prevalent in the latter cases. 
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exploiting (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; Tushman et al. 1997), yet limited systematic evidence exists 
concerning the performance implications of balance between these two organizational activities. We 
advance an emerging stream of research on exploration and exploitation in alliances (Beckman et al. 
2004; Koza and Lewin 1998; Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006; Lin et al. 2007; Park et al. 2002; Rothaermel 
2001; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004) by examining the performance implications of balance within and 
across domains of alliance formation. Our findings reveal that the traditional form of balance within the 
function and structure domains is disadvantageous whereas balance across the function and structure 
domains can contribute to firm performance. We also identify heterogeneity in firms’ abilities to benefit 
from balance within and across domains. Hence, we divert attention from the basic question of whether a 
balance between exploration and exploitation is desirable to focus on the means by which firms can best 
leverage different forms of balance in their alliance formation decisions.  
Our framework complements the organizational and temporal separation approaches by underscoring 
the merits of balancing exploration and exploitation across domains as opposed to balance within domains. 
In fact, the traditional approach to the ambidexterity problem (Tushman and O’Reilly 1996) can be 
considered a special case of our framework whereby the firm balances exploration and exploitation within 
a single domain by allocating technological activities to separate organizational units. According to 
Benner and Tushman, “ambidextrous organizations are composed of multiple tightly coupled subunits 
that are themselves loosely coupled with each other. Within subunits the tasks, culture, individuals, and 
organizational arrangements are consistent, but across subunits tasks and cultures are inconsistent and 
loosely coupled” (2003: 247). The main difference between such organizational separation and our 
approach is that in the case of alliances, separation takes place across domains of the alliance portfolio 
rather than across organizational units. Indeed, a firm’s use of alliances for exploration or exploitation 
may entail separation between internal organizational units that pursue one type of activity from alliances 
that serve to carry out the other. Nevertheless, since in most cases alliances serve to both explore and 
exploit, domain separation is not equivalent to organizational separation. Even when a firm establishes a 
dedicated alliance function, such a corporate unit is responsible for all types of alliances regardless of the 
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function that they serve or the incumbency status of partners in the alliance portfolio. 
Resolving the exploration-exploitation dilemma in alliance portfolios 
Traditionally, research on exploration and exploitation has limited its focus to balance within a single 
domain, such as in the case of technology versus marketing and production alliances in the function 
domain (Rothaermel and Deeds 2004) or new versus prior partners in the structure domain (Lin et al. 
2007). Our study demonstrates that this form of balance within domains contributes to financial 
performance neither in the short term nor in the long term. In particular, a firm does not benefit from 
simultaneously leveraging its alliances to generate new knowledge and to utilize existing knowledge. 
Furthermore, in line with prior research (Lin et al. 2007), a firm that simultaneously invests in seeking 
new partners and renewing existing alliance relationships can expect decline in its market value and net 
profit. We ascribe this performance decline to resource allocation tradeoffs and inconsistent partnering 
routines that offset the benefits of simultaneously extending the reach and receptivity to network 
resources. The inability to develop and employ consistent partnering routines (Nelson and Winter 1982) 
and the misapplication of such routines (Jensen and Szulanski 2004; Lavie and Miller, 2008) result in 
negative learning effects that impede processes of forming, managing, and assessing alliances. 
Furthermore, our findings reveal that the impediments associated with balance within domains 
exacerbate with firm size. In contrast to preliminary findings of prior research (Lin et al. 2007), we show 
that as a firm accumulates assets, balance within a domain incurs losses and decline in market value since 
the firm may lose flexibility and hence its ability to reconcile conflicting exploration and exploitation 
routines within a given domain. Besides routine rigidity, the firm may become less dependent on its 
alliances as it accumulates internal assets, which exacerbates resource allocation tradeoffs in the alliance 
portfolio and undermines performance. Firms that nurture extensive alliance portfolios often develop 
consistent partnering routines and attempt to coordinate their engagements in multiple alliances. Despite 
the immediate merits of such practices (Hoffmann 2007; Kale et al. 2002; Lavie 2007; Zollo et al. 2002), 
we caution that as a firm grows and perhaps extends its alliance portfolio, the difficulty of balancing 
exploration and exploitation within the function or structure domains can impair financial performance.   
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Whereas balancing exploration and exploitation within domains does not lead to desirable 
performance, our findings underscore the merits of balance across domains. A firm can increase its profits 
and market value by exploring in one domain while exploiting in another, yet faces declining performance 
when attempting to simultaneously explore in both domains. This form of balance enhances both 
innovativeness and productivity without needing to reconcile conflicting partnering routines or coping 
with resource allocation tradeoffs within each domain. The firm can effectively discover new knowledge 
while leveraging its relational embeddedness with familiar partners or rather extend its network reach and 
social capital while leveraging its existing knowledge base. Attempts to simultaneously explore by 
initiating R&D alliances while seeking new partners introduce undesirable managerial challenges, 
whereas attempts to simultaneously reinforce existing relationships while engaging in marketing and 
production alliances degenerate the alliance portfolio by restricting heterogeneity and access to 
technological opportunities. Consequently, a firm that balances exploration and exploitation across 
domains can more effectively reap the benefits of balance. Nevertheless, such a firm still faces the 
challenge of deciding whether to concentrate on exploration or exploitation in a given domain. Trial and 
error is not advisable since this approach may draw the firm toward balance within domains. A firm may 
need to identify its relative strengths within each domain, consider performance feedback, and examine 
the nature of partnering opportunities when deciding whether to explore or exploit in a given domain. 
Furthermore, balancing exploration and exploitation across domains becomes a more attractive form 
of balance as a firm gains in size. A small firm cannot effectively leverage balance across domains, 
possibly due to the inability of its internal organization to complement alliance operations in a given 
domain. Despite its dependence on alliances, its challenge of attracting prominent partners may limit the 
prospects of specialization and exclusive reliance on alliances for either exploration or exploitation. Yet, 
as the firm grows, it faces more dominant resource allocation constraints in its alliance portfolio and its 
partnering routines are likely to become more rigid. Hence, a growing firm can gain more by specializing 
in either exploration or exploitation within a given domain. For such firm, balance across domains 
becomes a more efficient solution although it can also rely on organizational separation to support 
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specialization. Hence, by discretionally manipulating exploration and exploitation tendencies within and 
across domains, firms can maximize the benefits of their alliance portfolios both in the short term and in 
the long term.  
Directions for future research 
This study contributes to understanding the conditions and means by which firms can benefit from 
balancing exploration and exploitation in their alliance portfolios, yet leaves room for future research. 
First, we have studied the function and structure domains following established research on alliances (e.g., 
Beckman, et al. 2004; Grant and Baden-Fuller 2004; Koza and Lewin 1998; Lin et al. 2007; Park et al. 
2002; Rothaermel 2001). Future research may consider additional domains corresponding to the attributes 
of alliance partners, such as their industry focus (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006). It may refine some domains, 
for instance, by studying the degree of technological innovation (Christensen 1998) promoted by alliances 
in the function domain instead of dichotomously categorizing alliances based on their value chain 
functions. It may be also worthwhile to examine exploration and exploitation in this domain based on the 
productive outcomes of upstream and downstream alliances. Additionally, future research may advance 
the ambidexterity literature by uncovering relevant domains of exploration and exploitation within a 
firm’s organization, thus extending our approach to the intra-organizational context. We believe, however, 
that since our logic is not dependent on the nature of domain, consideration of additional domains is 
likely to produce consistent findings.    
Second, our study complements prior research that has studied the balance between exploration and 
exploitation within organizational boundaries (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997; He and Wong 2004; Jansen, 
Van Den Bosch, and Volberda 2006; Sidhu et al. 2007; Tushman and O’Reilly 1996) by considering 
balance in alliances that transcend such boundaries. Besides balancing exploration and exploitation across 
domains in the firm’s alliance portfolio, a firm can balance these activities across organizational 
boundaries, i.e., exploit internally while exploring through alliances or vice versa. It can also engage in 
acquisitions to facilitate its exploration or exploitation efforts. Such approaches can substitute the need for 
balance within the function or structure domains of the alliance portfolio. In the current study we sought 
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to control for these alternative modes, but future research may directly investigate the performance 
implications of balance within and across organizational boundaries by simultaneously studying 
exploration via internal units, alliances, and acquisitions. Such research may identify additional tradeoffs 
and optimal policies for exploring and exploiting through various organizational modes.  
Third, once scholars juxtapose exploration and exploitation tendencies within and across 
organizational boundaries they can effectively assess the advantages of domain separation compared to 
organizational separation and temporal separation. Domain separation may be superior yet accompanied 
by organizational separation or temporal separation which play a role in shaping organizational tradeoffs 
and nurturing exploration and exploitation routines. Nevertheless, studying organizational separation may 
require more intimate understanding of firms’ organizational structures and the roles of their various units. 
Fourth, future research may examine additional contingencies besides firm size that may shape the 
benefits of balancing exploration and exploitation within and across domains. For instance, recent 
research has underscored the role of environmental uncertainty, dynamism, and competitiveness (Jansen 
et al. 2006; Lin et al. 2007; Park et al. 2002), shedding some light on the interplay between internal and 
external drivers of exploration and exploitation effects. These drivers may shape the effects of balance 
within and across domains of the alliance portfolio. In addition, we underscore the role of routine rigidity 
and other organizational impediments that may steer a firm away from balance within domains. Perhaps 
future research can identify organizational forces that relieve firms from resource allocation tradeoffs and 
mitigate the costs of balance within domains. Interestingly, increases in firm size which make balance 
within domains less favorable in the alliance portfolio relax resource allocation constraints in the internal 
organization, and may thus enhance the benefits of balance within intra-organizational domains.  
Finally, future research may test our framework in other industries. We have focused on the software 
industry, since its intensity of alliance formation enables us to effectively track patterns of exploration and 
exploitation. Resource allocation tradeoffs and inconsistent organizational routines may be more or less 
critical for firm performance in other industries. Furthermore, the optimal level of balance may vary 
across industries. For instance, in highly dynamic industries balance may be achieved at higher levels of 
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exploration, whereas stable industries may favor higher levels of exploitation. Nevertheless, while firms 
in other industries may demonstrate different patterns within certain domains, we still expect that balance 
across domains will be more advantageous than balance within domains of the alliance portfolio.  
This study makes important strides toward resolving the dilemma posed by March (1991). It furnishes 
evidence on the implications of balancing exploration and exploitation, revealing how they depend on the 
means by which firms pursue this balance and on their organizational characteristics. Whereas balance 
within alliance domains can be detrimental to firm performance, balancing exploration and exploitation 
across such domains serves as a beneficial approach. The ambidexterity literature, while acknowledging 
the challenge of reconciling conflicting organizational routines that support exploration versus 
exploitation, has called for organizational separation which in and of itself is difficult to develop and 
maintain. Our approach does not require the nurturing of inconsistent managerial practices at the 
corporate level, the hiring of nimble managers, the use of job rotation and other managerial techniques 
that impose their own organizational challenges. Rather, it entails recognizing the multidimensionality of 
the problem by looking at multiple organizational domains, thus enhancing firm performance without 
facing the adverse consequences of introducing organizational buffers or constantly modifying 
organizational structures, which is especially problematic for a firm that manages large-scale operations.  
 
Appendix – First Stage Model 
In this study we used a two-stage analysis to account for endogeneity in firms’ tendencies to engage in 
exploration and exploitation. Specifically, firms’ decisions to engage in exploration versus exploitation 
may change over time (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006) or throughout product life cycles (Rothaermel and 
Deeds 2004). In addition, as firms mature they may become more dependent on their established routines 
and skills (Hannan and Freeman 1984) and thus less likely to change their strategic orientations (Kelly 
and Amburgey 1991) and engage in exploration. Prior research also suggests that tendencies to explore or 
exploit vary with firm size (Beckman et al. 2004; Rothaermel and Deeds 2004). Moreover, firms’ external 
exploration activities through alliances may complement or substitute internal exploration activities. The 
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availability of financial funds may further facilitate slack-induced search (Bourgeois 1981; Levinthal and 
March 1981; March 1976; Nohria and Gulati 1996). In turn, prior partnering experience has been 
associated with organizational inertia (Li and Rowley 2002) and may account for path dependence in 
alliance formation decisions in the structure domain (Chung et al. 2000; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999). 
Finally, prior experience in exploring in the function or structure domains may influence future 
exploration tendencies in the corresponding domain (Lavie and Rosenkopf 2006).  
Therefore, in the first-stage models we regressed function exploration and structure exploration at 
time t on a firm’s age, size, R&D intensity, financial solvency, partnering experience, and exploration 
experience in the corresponding domain at time t-1. Prior partnering experience was computed as a count 
of all prior alliances formed by the focal firm with any partner between 1985 and the preceding year. 
Exploration experience was calculated with the same formulas used for constructing our exploration 
measures, but instead of incorporating the alliances formed in year t we counted alliances between 1985 
and the preceding year (t-1). All the independent variables in the first-stage model were lagged by one 
year relative to the dependent variables with the exception of firm age, which was time-invariant given 
the inclusion of year fixed effects. All remaining interfirm heterogeneity in exploration-exploitation was 
controlled for by firm fixed effects. The combination of year and firm fixed effects in addition to the prior 
history of exploration experience effectively accounts for unobserved heterogeneity (Blundell et al. 1995). 
The first-stage Tobit model (Tobin 1958) reported in Table 6 was estimated using maximum likelihood 
estimation while accounting for the panel structure of the data and correcting for autocorrelation using 
first-order AR(1) process. The values of the dependent variables were forced to range between 0 and 1.  
Insert Table 6 about here 
 
Table 6 reports the results of the first-stage model, predicting function exploration and structure 
exploration in alliances. The results reveal that prior partnering experience facilitates exploitation in the 
structure domain (β = -0.001, p < .05), consistent with prior research that shows how extensive partnering 
experience encourages firms to seek prior partners for their new alliances (Beckman et al. 2004; Lavie 
and Rosenkopf 2006). Additionally, exploration in both the function and structure domains was 
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negatively related to prior experience in the corresponding domain (β = -0.259; β = -0.601, p < .001). 
Most of the variance in function exploration and structure exploration can be ascribed to prior experience 
as well as to the firm and year fixed effects that capture unobserved heterogeneity in firm-specific 
characteristics and temporal trends, partially at the expense of other predictors. In auxiliary analysis we 
dropped the fixed effects and the exploration experience variables and found that other predictors, such as 
the firm’s size, solvency and partnering experience significantly account for variance in exploration 
tendencies. Nevertheless, because our main concern was with controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
rather than with uncovering the antecedents of exploration and exploitation, we retained the experience 
variables and fixed effects in the first-stage models. In accordance with Baum, Schaffer and Stillman 
(2003) we conducted Sargan difference tests for endogeneity (a robust version of the Hausman test) 
which confirmed that function exploration is endogenous in the market value model (χ2 =34.494, p < 
0.0001) and that structure exploration is endogenous in the market value (χ2 =57.115, p < 0.0001) and net 
profit models (χ2 =30.573, p < 0.0001). Furthermore, we ran several tests to ensure that our instrumental 
variables in the first stage are relevant and significant. To offer conservative assessments we dropped the 
firm fixed effects when conducting these tests. Tests of joint significance of our endogenous regressors 
revealed that our instrumental variables are significant per the Anderson-Rubin Wald test and based on 
the Stock-Wright LMS statistic. Then, we used the weak identification test (Stock, Wright and Yogo 
2002) that produced Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics which were larger than the Stock-Yogo critical value. 
These latter statistics are conservative since they account for size distortions to weak instruments and 
correct for the number of instruments (Bascle, 2008). Overall, these results indicate the strength of our 
instrumental variables and support our reliance on two-stage models.13   
                                                 
13 In auxiliary analysis we ran single-stage models in which the original exploration variables were used with no 
correction for endogeneity. Consistent results were obtained with respect to the moderating effects of firm size on 
the relationships between balance within the function domain and the firm’s market value and net profit as well as 
between balance within the structure domain and the firm’s market value, in partial support of Hypothesis 3. 
Additionally, the interactions of firm size with function exploration and structure exploration produced some 
significant effects in partial support of Hypothesis 4. 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive Statistics and Pairwise Correlations for Sampled Firms during 1990-2001 
  
Variable N Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 
1. Function Exploration t 2587 0.461 0.355  
2. Structure Exploration t 2406 0.892 0.188 -.099***            
3. Firm Size t-1 2216 0.381 1.477  .024 -.092***           
4. Firm Age 2001 2587 18.018 8.256 -.008 -.006  .067**          
5. Firm R&D Intensity t-1 1965 0.347 1.099 -.001  .013 -.045* -.141***         
6. Firm Solvency t-1 2204 4.592 4.508  .071*** -.110*** -.077*** -.049*  .0044        
7. Partnering Experience t-1 2587 22.238 55.373  .072*** -.218***  .533***  .023 -.028  .192***     
8. Function Explor. Experience t-1 2244 0.469 0.278  .279*** -.118***  .013 -.013  .051*  .070**  .088***    
9. Structure Explor. Experience t-1 2070 0.925 0.095 -.144***   .251*** -.181*** -.001 -.020 -.170*** -.418*** -.220***   
10. Firm Market Value t+1 2306 2.125 17.646  .036† -.105***  .454***  .071*** -.018  .106***  .721***  .054* -.193***   
11. Firm Net Profit t+1 2412 0.011 0.541  .014*** -.074***  .203***  .118*** -.016  .053*  .503***  .027 -.125***  .671***
12. Firm Size t 2355 0.410 1.523  .024 -.096***  .890***  .084*** -.049* -.076***  .480***  .011 -.166***  .561*** -.011 
13. Firm R&D Intensity t 2121 0.359 1.103  .038†  .042* -.346*** -.126***  .564***  .044* -.033  .045* -.001 -.019 -.015 -.049*
14. Firm Solvency t 2341 4.762 4.577  .077*** -.097*** -.097*** -.051*  .003  .730***  .188***  .077*** -.160***  .100*** -.061** -.079*** 
15. Size of Alliance Portfolio t 2564 -0.959 3.038  .003  .042* -.346*** -.188***  .179***  .040† -.158*** -.005  .113*** -.138*** -.042* -.390*** 
16. Alliance Age t 2587 1.767 0.529  .038† -.169***  .075***  .099*** -.018  .109***  .220*** -.002 -.167***  .018  .028  .067** 
17. Partners per Alliance t 2587 2.158 0.603  .075*** -.097***  .131***  .069*** -.025 -.024  .129***  .078*** -.110***  .097***  .070***  .131*** 
18. Agreements per Alliance t 2587 0.057 0.056  .269*** -.056** -.008  .066***  .018  .025 -.037†  .261*** -.048* -.007  .005 -.010
19. % Foreign Partners t 2587 0.176 0.196 -.053** -.046* -.010 -.021  .035  .033  .045*  .008 -.088***  .011  .007*** -.018
20. % Joint Ventures t 2587 0.033 0.105 -.045*  .012  .128***  .121*** -.018 -.145***  .021 -.009  .025  .045*  .035†  .117*** 
21. % Strategic Alliances t 2587 0.301 0.270  .155*** -.051*  .117***  .113*** -.018 -.044*  .061**  .130*** -.068**  .088***  .066**  .126*** 
22. Acquisitions t 2587 0.817 2.018  .018 -.093***  .471***  .106*** -.062**   022  .470***  .016 -.156***  .531***  .368***  .495*** 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 
14. Firm Solvency t  .002         
15. Size of Alliance Portfolio t  .168***  .014        
16. Alliance Age t -.041†  .080*** -       
17. Partners per Alliance t -.022 -.357† -  .016      
18. Agreements per Alliance t   .040†  .022 -.044* -.010  .044*     
19. % Foreign Partners t  .039  .029  .008  .086***  .014  .075***    
20. % Joint Ventures t -.014 -.138*** - -.030  .163**
*
 .047*  .118**
*
  
21. % Strategic Alliances t -.010 -.028 - -.036†  .166**
*
 .310*** -.001 -.016  
22. Acquisitions t -.055*  .00 -  .070***  .076**
*
 .008  .004  .071***  .164*** 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001
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TABLE 2 
Fixed Effects Panel AR(1) Second-Stage Models for Firm Market Value – Balance Within Domains 
 
Exploration variables predicted from first-stage model. Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Dependent Variable: Market Value t+1 Model 
1MV 
Model 
2MV 
Model 
3MV 
Model 
4MV 
Model 
5MV 
Model 
6MV 
Model 
7MV 
Intercept  2.216 
(4.285) 
-1.398
(5.588) 
 70.45***
(15.52) 
 66.35***
(16.19) 
-2.454 
(3.394) 
-71.03*** 
(10.14) 
-52.86***
(9.819) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Size t 3.115***
(0.164) 
 3.109*** 
(0.181) 
 3.141*** 
(0.185) 
 3.09*** 
(0.19) 
 19.99*** 
(0.776) 
 143.1*** 
(3.820) 
 106.5*** 
(4.128) 
Firm R&D Intensity t -0.035 
(0.142) 
-0.089 
(0.208) 
-0.023 
(0.213) 
-0.108 
(0.215) 
 0.007 
(0.172) 
-0.050 
(0.145) 
-0.007 
(0.142) 
Firm Solvency t -0.015   
(0.042) 
-0.003   
(0.050) 
-0.010   
(0.053) 
-0.002   
(0.053) 
-0.030   
(0.035) 
-0.034   
(0.034) 
-0.040   
(0.031) 
Size of Alliance Portfolio t  0.699*** 
(0.180) 
 0.865*** 
(0.227) 
 1.064*** 
(0.244) 
 1.052*** 
(0.243) 
 0.515*** 
(0.153) 
 0.316* 
(0.152) 
 0.276* 
(0.139) 
Alliance Age t -0.162   
(0.340) 
 0.013   
(0.405) 
 0.200   
(0.431) 
 0.160   
(0.430) 
-0.133   
(0.235) 
 0.015   
(0.276) 
-0.062   
(0.258) 
Partners per Alliance t -0.512† 
(0.295) 
-0.813* 
(0.352) 
-0.910* 
(0.368) 
-0.884* 
(0.368) 
-0.134 
(0.235) 
 0.026 
(0.230) 
 0.144 
(0.210) 
Agreements per Alliance t -3.259 
(3.664) 
-3.378  
(4.953) 
-6.526  
(5.586) 
-4.721  
(5.617) 
-3.183  
(3.271) 
 0.156  
(3.429) 
-1.930  
(3.134) 
% Foreign Partners t -0.701  
(0.955) 
-1.232  
(1.262) 
-1.171  
(1.380) 
-1.269  
(1.376) 
-0.147  
(0.837) 
-0.022  
(0.851) 
 0.147  
(0.774) 
% Joint Ventures t -3.029 
(1.874) 
-5.470† 
(2.830) 
-5.816† 
(3.049) 
-5.719† 
(3.044) 
-2.200 
(1.838) 
-3.832* 
(1.854) 
-3.553* 
(1.676) 
% Strategic Alliances t  0.924   
(0.785) 
 1.538   
(1.056) 
 2.570*   
(1.196) 
 2.399*   
(1.193) 
 1.619*   
(0.690) 
 1.403†   
(0.729) 
 1.451*   
(0.657) 
Acquisitions  0.699***
(0.104) 
 0.800***
(0.118) 
 0.854***
(0.123) 
 0.860***
(0.123) 
 0.489*** 
(0.090) 
 0.135† 
(0.082) 
 0.087 
(0.079) 
Function Exploration t    -12.10 
(8.740) 
 -16.56 
(11.29) 
 21.69***   
(6.364) 
  4.624 
(6.603) 
Function Exploration t2     18.37* 
(8.122) 
  25.52* 
(10.207)
-24.09*** 
(5.804)  
-10.70† 
(5.992) 
Structure Exploration t     -152.1***
(35.53) 
-158.2***
(35.51)  
 165.5*** 
(23.45) 
 133.3*** 
(22.03) 
Structure Exploration t2    
 
 85.38*** 
(21.70) 
 89.87*** 
(21.69)  
-95.74*** 
(14.27) 
-79.22*** 
(13.40) 
Firm Size t x  Function Exploration t       -110.5
*** 
(3.553)  
-60.47*** 
(4.127) 
Firm Size t x  Function Exploration t2       136.17
*** 
(3.735)  
 71.76*** 
(4.498) 
Firm Size t x  Structure Exploration t        
-311.6*** 
(9.515) 
-206.4*** 
(11.24) 
Firm Size t x  Structure Exploration t2        
 170.2*** 
(5.886) 
111.84*** 
(6.874) 
AR(1) Parameter 0.437  0.407  0.392  0.388 0.018 0.216 0.087 
N Firm-Years 2041  1768  1674  1674 1768 1674 1674 
N Firms 339  327  320  320 327 320 320 
VIF 1.699  2.975  5.862  7.406 7.204 79.31 137.4 
-2Log Likelihood 12427.3  10979.8  10458.6  10448.8 9782.0 8908.9 8673.7 
∆ -2LL   7.4*  21.7***  31.5*** 1205.2***  1571.4*** 1806.6***
  38
TABLE 3 
Fixed Effects Panel AR(1) Second-Stage Models for Firm Net Profit – Balance Within Domains 
 
Exploration variables predicted from first-stage model. Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p <.01, *** p < .001 
Dependent Variable: Net Profit t+1 Model 
1NP 
Model 
2NP 
Model 
3NP 
Model 
4NP 
Model 
5NP 
Model 
6NP 
Model 
7NP 
Intercept  0.176 
(0.292) 
 0.064
(0.360) 
 2.508**
(0.886) 
 2.415**
(0.926) 
-0.098 
(0.283) 
-1.485 
(0.830) 
-0.703
(0.798) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included
Firm Size t -0.329***
(0.010) 
-0.312***
(0.011) 
-0.308***
(0.011) 
-0.309***
(0.011) 
1.128*** 
(0.064) 
 5.540***
(0.336) 
 3.622***
(0.350) 
Firm R&D Intensity t -0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
 0.0001 
(0.012) 
-0.000 
(0.012) 
-0.0001 
(0.011) 
Firm Solvency t -0.001   
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.002 
(0.003) 
-0.001 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Size of Alliance Portfolio t  0.038*** 
(0.010) 
 0.052*** 
(0.013) 
 0.062*** 
(0.014) 
 0.061*** 
(0.014) 
 0.055*** 
(0.012) 
 0.046*** 
(0.013) 
 0.047*** 
(0.012) 
Alliance Age t -0.014   
(0.018) 
 0.0002   
(0.022) 
 0.009   
(0.024) 
 0.008   
(0.024) 
 0.009   
(0.021) 
 0.013   
(0.022) 
 0.013   
(0.021) 
Partners per Alliance t -0.027† 
(0.016) 
-0.054** 
(0.020) 
-0.062** 
(0.021) 
-0.061** 
(0.021) 
-0.055** 
(0.018) 
-0.050** 
(0.019) 
-0.053** 
(0.018) 
Agreements per Alliance t -0.332 
(0.201) 
-0.336 
(0.287) 
-0.594† 
(0.327) 
-0.547† 
(0.329) 
-0.305 
(0.256) 
-0.408 
(0.296) 
-0.297 
(0.271) 
% Foreign Partners t -0.017 
(0.054) 
-0.013 
(0.073) 
-0.008 
(0.080) 
-0.012 
(0.080) 
 0.045 
(0.065) 
 0.021 
(0.073) 
 0.071 
(0.067) 
% Joint Ventures t -0.006 
(0.104) 
-0.028 
(0.162) 
-0.040 
(0.179) 
-0.039 
(0.178) 
-0.126 
(0.143) 
 0.005 
(0.160) 
-0.130 
(0.145) 
% Strategic Alliances t -0.020 
(0.044) 
 0.010 
(0.062) 
 0.034 
(0.070) 
 0.031 
(0.070) 
 0.013 
(0.055) 
 0.005 
(0.064) 
 0.028 
(0.058) 
Acquisitions  0.024*** 
(0.005) 
 0.028*** 
(0.006) 
 0.028*** 
(0.007) 
 0.028*** 
(0.007) 
 0.033*** 
(0.006) 
 0.014* 
(0.006) 
 0.024*** 
(0.006) 
Function Exploration t    -0.026 
(0.474) 
 -0.674 
(0.652) 
 1.552***  
(0.442) 
  0.678 
(0.552) 
Function Exploration t2     0.233 
(0.449) 
  0.916 
(0.591) 
-1.464*** 
(0.419)  
-0.678 
(0.504) 
Structure Exploration t     -5.348** 
(1.988) 
-5.506** 
(1.989)  
 3.873* 
(1.882) 
 1.485 
(1.763) 
Structure Exploration t2    
 
 3.154** 
(1.216) 
 3.265** 
(1.217)  
-2.215† 
(1.148) 
-0.686 
(1.075) 
Firm Size t x  Function Exploration t       -6.433
*** 
(0.283)  
-5.367***
(0.353) 
Firm Size t x  Function Exploration t2        6.624
*** 
(0.296)  
 4.789*** 
(0.380) 
Firm Size t x  Structure Exploration t        
-13.71***
(0.840) 
-4.683***
(0.958) 
Firm Size t x  Structure Exploration t2       
 7.944*** 
(0.523) 
 1.994*** 
(0.591) 
AR(1) Parameter  0.655  0.594  0.574  0.572  0.393  0.516  0.409 
N Firm-Years  2072  1748  1651  1651  1748  1651  1651 
N Firms  339  327  320  320  327  320  320 
VIF  1.896  2.937  5.876  7.722  7.129  78.69  136.1 
-2Log Likelihood  774.2  892.1  910.1  907.0  480.1  572.7  261.3 
∆ -2LL   1.1  7.4*  10.5*  413.1***   344.8***  656.2***
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TABLE 4 
Fixed Effects Panel AR(1) Second-Stage Models for Firm Market Value – Balance Across Domains 
 
Exploration variables predicted from first-stage model. Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
Dependent Variable: Market Value t+1 Net Profit t+1 
 Model 
1MV 
Model 
8 MV 
Model 
9 MV 
Model 
10 MV 
Model 
1NP 
Model 
8 NP 
Model 
9NP 
Model 
10 NP 
Intercept  2.216 
(4.285) 
 6.942
(8.309) 
-32.05*
(12.77) 
 16.67*
(7.159) 
 0.176 
(0.292) 
 0.258 
(0.430) 
-1.081
(0.733) 
 0.043
(0.606) 
Firm Fixed Effects & Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm Size t 3.115*** 
(0.164) 
 3.141*** 
(0.186) 
 3.072*** 
(0.186) 
-71.89*** 
(3.132) 
-0.329***
(0.010) 
-0.308*** 
(0.010) 
-0.309***
(0.011) 
-2.617***
(0.277) 
Firm R&D Intensity t -0.035 
(0.142) 
-0.089 
(0.215) 
-0.084 
(0.215) 
-0.035 
(0.135) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.013) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
Firm Solvency t -0.015   
(0.042) 
-0.002   
(0.053) 
-0.005   
(0.053) 
-0.066*   
(0.030) 
-0.001   
(0.002) 
-0.001   
(0.003) 
-0.001   
(0.003) 
-0.004   
(0.003) 
Size of Alliance Portfolio t  0.699*** 
(0.180) 
 1.014*** 
(0.245) 
 0.985*** 
(0.244) 
 0.134 
(0.135) 
 0.038*** 
(0.010) 
 0.060*** 
(0.014) 
 0.059*** 
(0.014) 
 0.040*** 
(0.012) 
Alliance Age t -0.162   
(0.340) 
 0.159   
(0.433) 
 0.099   
(0.431) 
-0.009   
(0.249) 
-0.014   
(0.018) 
 0.008   
(0.024) 
 0.006   
(0.024) 
 0.015   
(0.020) 
Partners per Alliance t -0.512† 
(0.295) 
-0.934* 
(0.370) 
-0.919* 
(0.368) 
 0.245 
(0.204) 
-0.027† 
(0.016) 
-0.063** 
(0.021) 
-0.062** 
(0.021) 
-0.054** 
(0.018) 
Agreements per Alliance t -3.259 
(3.664) 
-4.443  
(5.651) 
-3.927  
(5.623) 
-4.864 
(3.053) 
-0.332 
(0.201) 
-0.521 
(0.329) 
-0.507 
(0.328) 
-0.395 
(0.268) 
% Foreign Partners t -0.701  
(0.955) 
-1.211  
(1.385) 
-1.228  
(1.378) 
-0.448  
(0.753) 
-0.017 
(0.054) 
-0.006 
(0.081) 
-0.006 
(0.080) 
 0.042 
(0.066) 
% Joint Ventures t -3.029 
(1.874) 
-6.695* 
(3.061) 
-6.290* 
(3.044) 
-5.309** 
(1.631) 
-0.006 
(0.104) 
-0.066 
(0.178) 
-0.045 
(0.178) 
-0.176 
(0.143) 
% Strategic Alliances t  0.924   
(0.785) 
 2.099*   
(1.197) 
 2.402*   
(1.193) 
 1.735**   
(0.638) 
-0.020 
(0.044) 
 0.019 
(0.070) 
 0.030 
(0.070) 
 0.030 
(0.057) 
Acquisitions  0.699*** 
(0.104) 
 0.863***
(0.123) 
 0.869*** 
(0.123) 
 0.080 
(0.075) 
 0.024*** 
(0.005) 
 0.029*** 
(0.007) 
 0.029*** 
(0.007) 
 0.022*** 
(0.006) 
Function Exploration t     8.635† 
(4.819) 
 84.47*** 
(19.49) 
-39.58*** 
(11.20) 
  0.233 
(0.277) 
 2.862** 
(1.091) 
-0.533 
(0.932) 
Structure Exploration t    -12.96* 
(5.553) 
 30.83* 
(19.49) 
-16.40* 
(7.045) 
 -0.233 
(0.311) 
 1.276† 
(0.681) 
 0.068 
(0.582) 
Function Exploration t  × 
Structure Exploration t   
  -84.39
*** 
(21.03) 
 42.06*** 
(12.10) 
  -2.928
* 
(1.175) 
 0.788 
(1.006) 
Firm Size t x  Function Exploration t      
170.07*** 
(4.591) 
   
 6.314*** 
(0.406) 
Firm Size t x  Structure Exploration t      
 78.66*** 
(3.283) 
   
 3.074*** 
(0.291) 
Firm Size t x Function Exploration t x  
Structure Exploration t   
   
-188.7*** 
(4.929) 
   
-8.277*** 
(0.437) 
AR(1) Parameter  0.437  0.395  0.389  0.134  0.655  0.575  0.571  0.404 
N Firm-Years  2041  1674  1674  1674  2072  1651  1651  1651 
N Firms  339  320  320  320  339  320  320  320 
VIF  1.699  2.317  6.269  34.78  1.896  2.356  6.152  34.56 
-2Log Likelihood  12427.3  10470.8  10454.8  8545.7  774.2  916.2  910.0  229.3 
∆ -2LL   9.5**  25.5***  1934.6***   1.3  24.1†  688.2*** 
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TABLE 5 
Summary of Results 
 
Dependent Variable: Market Value Net Profit 
H1 Balance within   
(a) Function domain (∪ ) Partial support (linear term n.s.) n.s. 
(a) Structure domain (∪ ) Supported Supported 
H2 Balance across domains  
(negative interaction) 
Supported  Supported  
H3 Size moderation of balance within   
(a) Function domain (?U ) Supported Supported  
(a) Structure domain (?U ) Supported  Supported  
H4 Balance across domains 
(negative three-way interaction) 
Supported Partial support  
(unmoderated terms n.s.) 
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TABLE 6 
Fixed Effects Panel AR(1) First-Stage Tobit Models for Function/Structure Exploration 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Significance levels: † p < .1, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001 
 Function 
Exploration t
Structure 
Exploration t 
Intercept  1.073***
(0.227) 
 1.524*** 
(0.185) 
Firm Fixed Effects Included Included 
Year 1990  0.087 
(0.084) 
 0.316*** 
(0.060) 
Year 1991  0.081 
(0.057) 
 0.216*** 
(0.040) 
Year 1992  0.095†
(0.050) 
 0.101** 
(0.033) 
Year 1993  0.015 
(0.043) 
 0.049† 
(0.029) 
Year 1994  0.062 
(0.039) 
 0.093*** 
(0.025) 
Year 1995  0.085* 
(0.034) 
 0.026 
(0.022) 
Year 1996  0.124*** 
(0.029) 
 0.056** 
(0.019) 
Year 1997  0.105*** 
(0.028) 
 0.056** 
(0.015) 
Year 1998  0.045† 
(0.024) 
 0.008 
(0.015) 
Year 1999  0.039† 
(0.024) 
-0.000 
(0.014) 
Year 2000  0.037 
(0.023) 
-0.001 
(0.015) 
Year 2001   
Firm Size t-1 
 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
 0.002 
(0.005) 
Firm Age 2001 -0.005 
(0.025) 
-0.004 
(0.019) 
Firm R&D Intensity t-1 -0.012 
(0.008) 
 0.004 
(0.005) 
Firm Solvency t-1 -0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.000 
(0.001) 
Partnering Experience t-1  0.000 
(0.000) 
-0.001* 
(0.000) 
Function Explor. Experience t-1 
-0.259***
(0.045)  
Structure Explor. Experience t-1   
-0.601*** 
(0.085) 
AR(1) Parameter -0.069 -0.124 
N Firm-Years  1820  1722 
N Firms  330  322 
-2Log Likelihood  271.9  1431.5 
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FIGURE 1 
Impact of Balance Within the Function and Structure Domains on Market Value and Net Profit 
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FIGURE 2 
Impact of Balance Across the Function and Structure Domains on Market Value and Net Profit 
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Model 10: Balance across domains (min-sized firm)  
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